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INTRODUCTION 
This Article advances a simple claim in need of enforcement in 
this country right now: no person may be arrested for an alleged 
violation of civil, as opposed to criminal, law. Indeed, courts have 
long interpreted the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting arrest except 
when probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been 
committed and that the defendant is the person who committed the 
crime. However, in many places police take citizens into custody 
without a warrant for the non-criminal conduct of allegedly breaking 
civil laws.  
This unfortunate phenomenon received national attention in St. 
Louis, Missouri following the death of Michael Brown, an unarmed 
African-American teen shot by City of Ferguson police officer 
Darren Wilson during a pedestrian stop in 2014.
1
 The tragic incident 
resulted in angry protests targeted at local government and police for 
their history of problematic police practices used primarily against 
poor and minority residents. But in a cruel irony, such public calls for 
reform around municipal ordinance enforcement were met with 
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 1. Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a 
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say-
mike-brown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html. 
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further widespread arrests. Arrests that we believe were, and are, 
wholly unlawful.
2
  
As lawyers involved in the protest movement, we are aware of 
countless individuals handcuffed by St. Louis-area police, forcibly 
removed from the streets, and taken into custody for everything from 
“failing to disperse” to “interfering with police officer duties” to 
“unlawful assembly.”3 Many were held in jail for hours; some for 
days. Many paid bail to secure their release from custody pending 
trial, while others spent time in overcrowded and often filthy jail cells 
until they could be seen by the judge.
4
 Those found guilty of their 
alleged acts were generally sanctioned with fines. 
These events led to further critiques and some lawsuits, including 
one brought by the United States Department of Justice against the 
City of Ferguson.
5
 Attorneys and community activists deployed a 
range of arguments against police actions during this time. For 
instance, some challenged police treatment of arrestees; others 
alleged jail conditions failed to meet minimum standards.
6
 Money 
 
 2. As will be further discussed below, this Article seeks to expand upon our prior 
advocacy work in St. Louis following Michael Brown’s death, including testimony before the 
Ferguson Commission and litigation on behalf of those arrested during protests. See infra Part 
II. 
 3. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.040 (LEXIS through 2016 legislation) (unlawful assembly); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 574.060 (LEXIS through 2016 legislation) (failing to disperse); ST. LOUIS, 
MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode.com/library/mo/ st._louis_ 
county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701DEPO_701.110INOFUN 
(interfering with a police officer).  
 4. See, e.g., Amanda Terkel & Ryan Reilly, Ferguson Protestors Deal with Fallout After 
Arrests, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/ 
09/ferguson-arrests_n_5791136.html; Kimberly Kindy & Wesley Lowery, Ferguson Police 
Continued Crackdown on Protesters After Federal, State Intervention, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-police-continued-crackdown-on-
protesters-after-federal-state-interventions/2014/10/09/15df8a2a-4e40-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_ 
story.html. 
 5. Laura Wagner, Justice Department Sues Ferguson After City Amends Police Reform 
Deal, NPR (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/10/466 
329269/justice-department-sues-ferguson-after-city-amends-police-reform-deal; Investigation 
of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_ 
report.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen Deere, Suit Seeks $20 Million, Alleging Wrongful Arrests, 
Prosecutions in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.stltoday. 
com/news/local/crime-and-courts/suit-seeks-million-alleging-wrongful-arrests-prosecutions-in-
ferguson/article_be51dc4a-0f99-5a5d-a512-7aae4cac94ec.html; Matt Pearce, Missouri Cities, 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/11
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bail practices working to keep poor people in custody were attacked, 
as were mandatory fines that could not be satisfied by indigent 
defendants. Yet we believe these practices suffer from an even more 
fundamental problem—that police engage in forcible arrests for 
allegations that amount to nothing more than civil infractions.  
This Article seeks to advance this largely overlooked claim. And 
it does so as activists have again taken to the streets—not just in 
Ferguson, but across the country to express their grief and outrage 
around further unnecessary acts of violence on the part of law 
enforcement against people of color. As they publicly express their 
disgust with the killing of Philando Castille in Minnesota, Korryn 
Gaines in Maryland, Alton Sterling in Louisiana, and Paul O’Neil in 
Illinois,
7
 many peaceful protestors are again being met with arrest for 
alleged non-crimes relating to their peaceful assembly. And in the 
weeks leading up to the second anniversary of Mike Brown’s death, 
more demonstrators in the St. Louis area were arrested for protest 
activities.
8
 
In Part I.A, we explain how the act of arresting residents for 
municipal ordinance violations, generally considered civil infractions 
under state law, is unconstitutional. Thus, such civil arrest 
practices—unlawful under the Fourth Amendment—should not only 
be abandoned in Ferguson, but across the country as a matter of law. 
Moreover, as a matter of policy, failure to take such action will not 
only leave local governments open to yet more litigation, but 
 
Including Ferguson, Sued over ‘Grotesque’ Jail Conditions, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015, 5:37 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-lawsuit-20150209-story.html. 
 7. Priscilla Alvarez, Korryn Gains and the Conflicts Between Black Women and the 
Police, ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/ 08/korryn-
gaines-baltimore/494123/; Camila Domonoske & Bill Chappell, Minnesota Gov. Calls Traffic 
Stop Shooting ‘Absolutely Appalling at All Levels,’ NPR (July 7, 2016, 7:19 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/07/485066807/police-stop-ends-in-black-mans-
death-aftermath-is-livestreamed-online-video; Alton Sterling, Father of Five, Murdered by Police 
Two Months After “Blue Lives Matter” Bill Signed, DEMOCRACY NOW (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2016/7/7/alton_sterling_father_of_five_murdered; William Lee, 
Autopsy: Paul O’Neal Fatally Shot by Police in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2016, 8:13 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-paul-oneal-autopsy-20160817-story. html. 
 8. See, e.g., Rebecca Rivas, Four Arrested Disrupting Muny Show Singing ‘Freedom 
Song’ on Anniversary of Mike Brown’s Death, ST. LOUIS AM. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.stl 
american.com/news/local_news/four-arrested-while-disrupting-muny-show-singing-freedom-
song-on/article_834a9046-5eb0-11e6-9b9b-13c534a4eca3.html. 
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continue to deplete their already limited budgets and further 
exacerbate tensions in police-citizen relations in these fragile times. 
In Part I.B, we explain why civil arrest should be seen as 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
squarely addressed the issue, its search-and-seizure jurisprudence 
supports a determination that custodial arrest for alleged civil 
wrongdoing is simply unlawful. And while the Court’s traffic 
violation cases allow a fair amount of latitude for officers on the beat 
dealing with low-level matters, the Court has never countenanced 
widespread custodial arrest policies to address civil liability.  
As Part II describes, many police officers across the country 
effectuate arrests based on activities that do not rise to the level of 
criminal conduct. It focuses on Missouri to provide a striking 
example of civil arrest in practice. But until recently, such custodial 
encounters for low-level civil violations remained under the national 
legal radar. This occurred for a range of reasons—from a lack of 
lawyers for persons charged with such acts, the preference of 
litigators to settle cases without trial, and arcane provisions 
surrounding local legal proceedings. However, widespread arrests of 
Ferguson protestors for local municipal violations since the shooting 
death of Michael Brown have helped shine a light on problematic 
local practices that many of us already knew too well.
9
  
Over the decades, St. Louis County residents—particularly youth 
of color—have been routinely subjected to full-blown arrests for low-
level local ordinance violations. And despite the May 2016 settlement 
agreement reached between the United States Department of Justice 
and the City of Ferguson, as citizens again take to the streets to 
publicly mourn shootings of more black citizens by police, they are 
still being met by civil arrest.
10
  
 
 9. Tribune Wire Reports, Several Arrests on 4th Night of Ferguson Protests, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 11, 2015, 12:41 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-ferguson-
protest-shooting-20150810-story.html; see also Terkel & Reilly, supra note 4 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. Terkel & Reilly, supra note 4; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 
4:16-cv-000180-CDP (E.D. Mo. 2016); see also Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Department of 
Justice Reaches Settlement with Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/11
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In Part III, we call on municipalities to use common sense and cull 
their local codes to ensure they do not permit arrest in connection 
with mere civil or quasi-criminal cases. State legislatures should also 
create preemptive statewide standards that mandate citation for such 
matters to ensure that local officers do not overstep their roles. And 
police departments themselves can embrace citation requirements 
through training and otherwise to rethink the problematic practice of 
civil arrest. Unless and until these changes occur, local governments 
may find themselves contending with endless lawsuits and 
unnecessary costs as activists and their attorneys—who stand ready 
to take the issue to the United States Supreme Court—fight to ensure 
that peaceful protest is not met with uncivil act of civil arrest.  
I. LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CIVIL ARREST  
Ask almost any young child to tell you what the word “arrest” 
means and they can do so. In our experience representing children 
and teens this is based upon representation in television shows; 
pervasiveness in popular culture; and, sadly, in many instances, based 
upon their own experiences in the modern world.
11
 And yet the 
United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights—the document seen as 
most fundamental to the law of arrest—does not even use the word.
12
 
Instead, over time, case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements for lawful searches and seizures has developed the 
 
com/2016/01/28/us/department-of-justice-reaches-agreement-with-ferguson.html?_r=0 (noting 
the “agreement . . . calls for officers to stop making unwarranted arrests”). 
 11. Travis M. Andrews, Six-Year-Old Handcuffed and Several Other Children Under 11 
Arrested in Tennessee, Sparking Outrage, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/04/20/six-year-old-handcuffed-and-several-
other-children-under-age-11-arrested-in-tennessee-sparking-outrage/; More Young Children 
Getting Arrested, ABC NEWS (July 31, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=126807 
(“Florida Department of Juvenile Justice reported that more than 100 children aged 5 and 6 
have been arrested in Florida in the past 12 months.”). 
 12. See Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 393, 403 (1963) (“[D]ifficulties arise from the expression of the amendment’s 
protection in terms of ‘seizure’ rather than arrest.”). 
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concept and contours of what is considered “an arrest” in the United 
States
13
 and when such action may be undertaken by police.
14
  
A. Under Arrest in the Supreme Court 
Obviously, not every encounter with police amounts to an arrest. 
As one commentator has noted, the question of whether an arrest has 
occurred generally cannot be answered in the abstract.
15
 Instead, 
context is important. It is determined based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, viewed from the perspective of a “reasonable person” 
in the defendant’s situation.
16
 Thus, while an arrest does not have any 
firm, bright-line features, the longer the detention, the more 
movement from the place of initial encounter, and/or the more 
restrictions imposed on the suspect, the more likely the interaction 
has shifted from a consensual encounter of no constitutional import, 
to one that is considered a full-blown arrest for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.
17
  
Over time, the United States Supreme Court’s cases have 
provided some guideposts for what conduct rises to the level of a full-
blown arrest and must, therefore, be justified under the Fourth 
Amendment. For instance, the Court has made clear a “brief, on-the-
spot stop on the street” does “not fit comfortably within the 
traditional concept of an ‘arrest.’”
18
 In contrast, however, where a 
 
 13. Richard Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of “Stop” and 
“Arrest,” 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 771 (1982) (“Surprisingly, the development of the law 
governing seizures of people has been the stepchild of fourth amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 14. Id. at 776 (“Thus, to fully define the scope of fourth amendment limits on seizures of 
people, the Supreme Court must not only define the circumstances under which a seizure will 
be permissible, but it also must define with specificity the types of activity that constitute a 
seizure.”). For a comprehensive text describing constitutional arrest doctrine through 1965 and 
prior to the development of the Terry-stop doctrine for less intrusive seizures, see generally 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (Frank J. 
Remington ed., 2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter LAFAVE I]. 
 15. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 199 (5th ed., 2009) (“The question of 
when arrest occurred cannot be answered in the abstract . . . .”) [hereinafter LAFAVE II].   
 16. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (“whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”); United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[I]n view of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave . . . .”). 
 17. See LAFAVE I, supra note 15, at 242–44. 
 18. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/11
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defendant was picked up from his neighborhood, driven to police 
headquarters in a squad car, and then subjected to police questions, 
he was considered arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes.
19
    
B. Arrest Justification Jurisprudence 
But when are arrests permitted under the Fourth Amendment? The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for 
“[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable . . . seizures . . . .”
20
 It continues that this right “shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause 
supported by Oath or affirmation . . . .”
21
 Forming the foundation of 
our law of arrest, these few sentences have in many ways confounded 
academics, advocates, and law enforcement agents over the 
decades.
22
 
One recurring question is whether the Fourth Amendment requires 
warrants to effectuate seizures but allows for exceptions deemed 
reasonable as a matter of law, or if it allows for all reasonable 
searches and seizures, with those based upon a warrant being among 
those deemed reasonable.
23
 Under either scenario, police action 
rooted in probable cause is a key concept.
24
 The question then 
becomes, probable cause for what? 
 
 19. Id. at 212 (noting that the defendant was not told he was under arrest was irrelevant). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 21. Id.  
 22. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 62–63 (4th ed. 2010) (referring to the Fourth Amendment’s “text 
and its mysteries”). Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s “text does not indicate” how its 
different clauses “fit together[]”). 
 23. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 22, at 62 (“Perhaps the most controversial feature 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relates to the relationship between the . . . ‘reasonableness 
clause’ . . . and the . . . ‘warrant clause.’”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (describing the debate regarding the primacy of the 
warrant clause versus the reasonableness clause, and declaring the latter controls); Carol S. 
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 855 (1994) 
(disagreeing with Amar and urging warrant requirement as “touchstone of constitutionally 
‘reasonable searches’”). 
 24. See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1044 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It 
bears repeating that the ‘general rule’ is that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only 
if based on probable cause.”); see also Leagre, supra note 12, at 406 (“[I]n the few arrest cases 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Here, too, the Fourth Amendment is silent.
25
 Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court, case by case, has built our modern 
understanding of what probable cause modifies in the context of the 
law of arrest. Taken together, we believe, the Court’s past decisions 
make clear that arrest should take place only when there is a high 
probability—or probable cause—that a crime has been committed 
and that the defendant is the one who committed it. That is, an officer 
must possess a sufficiently firm belief that actual criminal conduct—
rather than some other law violation—has been committed by the 
defendant before the officer can place the defendant under arrest.  
For instance, in the context of issuing warrants, the Court has 
repeatedly made clear the focus must be on whether the information 
provided by police demonstrates the accused has engaged in actual 
“criminal activity . . . .”
26
 In Spinelli v. United States, the warrant 
application should have been denied as it did not sufficiently prove 
“that a crime[,]” there bookmaking, “was probably being 
committed.”
27
 Of course, the more rigid two-part test advanced in 
Spinelli has given way to Gates’s more flexible “totality of the 
circumstances” standard for warrant applications.
28
 But that has not 
lessened the level of wrongdoing at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment.
29
 Indeed, the Gates Court also spoke in terms of a 
sufficient showing relating to actual “criminal activity . . . .”
30
 
In the contexts of warrantless arrests, the Court has gone even 
further to drive home the need for an underlying crime to support an 
arrest—not some lesser or different kind of wrongdoing. For 
instance, in United States v. Watson, the Court—for the first time—
 
to reach it, the Court has clearly held that reasonableness for an arrest without a warrant 
requires the same degree of probable cause as is necessary for the issuance of a warrant.”); 
DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 22, at 141 (referring to “probable cause” as the “traditional 
standard” under the Fourth Amendment) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 25. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 26. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Unites States, 393 U.S. 410, 416–18 (1969). 
 27. Id. at 416–20. 
 28. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
 29. Three years ago, in Bailey v. United States, the majority decision noted: “This Court 
has stated ‘the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based 
on probable cause’ to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 
1037 (2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)). 
 30. Gates, 462 U.S. at 271–72. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/11
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permitted a warrantless arrest even when there was time to obtain a 
warrant.
31
 In doing so it made repeated reference to the fact that the 
defendant was suspected of not just a crime, but one that was a 
felony.
32
   
Indeed, it is worth noting Watson’s focus on the common law 
differences between felony and non-felony arrests.
33
 The former was 
appropriate even if the crime did not occur in the presence of the 
officer but was based upon a report provided by someone else.
34
 As 
to the latter, the requirements were more stringent.
35
 An arrest 
without a warrant would be permitted upon probable cause for 
misdemeanors only when the crime was committed in the presence of 
the officer.
36
 Thus, while it did not expressly embrace the same “in 
presence” requirement for misdemeanor arrests, Watson suggested 
misdemeanor crimes—and not anything less—provided the floor for 
lawful warrantless arrests.
37
  
Countless treatises, textbooks, and officer training materials 
describe the Fourth Amendment in the same way—as relating to the 
investigation of crimes as compared to other activity. For instance, 
professors Erwin Chemerinksy and Laurie Levenson devote an entire 
section of their Criminal Procedure casebook to the inquiry: “For 
What Crimes May a Person be Arrested?”
38
 Wayne LaFave’s popular 
hornbook further refers to probable cause to arrest for crimes, 
spending a great deal of time discussing the common law distinction 
between warrantless felony and misdemeanor arrest.
39
 This analysis, 
too, underscores the fact that misdemeanor conduct is the minimum 
requirement for warrantless arrests. Even police materials assume 
 
 31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  
 32. Id. In that instance, the crime in question was a felony—and still it would not justify 
warrantless arrest inside of a home—only in a public place. Id. at 424.  
 33. Id. at 421–23. 
 34. Id. at 418.  
 35. Id. at 422. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).  
 38. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 310 (2d ed. 
2013). 
 39. LAFAVE II, supra note 15, at 198–203. 
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that crimes are the only thing for which an officer can make an arrest 
based on probable cause.
40
 
The Supreme Court has sometimes used different vocabulary to 
frame the issue. For instance, the Court has discussed “probable 
cause” that an offense—rather than a crime—has occurred. This 
choice of words finds its genesis in early case law.
41
 But in most 
instances, the Court was referencing the same kind of activity: a 
violation of some component of criminal law, whether a felony or 
misdemeanor.
42
  
C. The Court’s Minor Misdeed Matters 
Over the last twenty years, the Court has turned its attention to the 
special problem of police engagement with traffic violators. The 
Supreme Court’s traffic cases suggest officers have a fair amount of 
latitude when dealing with quick-moving roadside encounters. But 
quite surprisingly, it has never squarely faced the question of whether 
full-blown arrests for civil traffic violations are lawful. Nevertheless, 
taken together, the Court’s traffic stop and search decisions further 
support a distinction between criminal activity and civil law 
violations for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
Perhaps one of the Court’s most well-known, and most lamented, 
traffic violation decisions involved Gail Atwater, a Texas mother 
who was stopped by a local police for failing to secure her young 
children with seatbelts.
43
 During the stop, rather than merely issue a 
ticket for the violation, the officer—who had encountered Ms. 
Atwater before—placed her in handcuffs, turned her children over to 
a friend, and transported her to the police station where she was 
booked.
44
 She secured her release by posting a bond, and ultimately 
 
 40. See, e.g., Devallis Rutledge, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, POLICE 
MAG. (June 7, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2011/06/probable-
cause-and-reasonable-suspicion.aspx (“‘Probable cause’ means reasonably reliable information 
to suspect there is a ‘fair probability’ that a person has committed a crime . . . .”). 
 41. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925). 
 42. See, e.g., Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (focusing on whether probable cause existed 
for a state law violation of transporting liquor). 
 43. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 44. Id. at 324.  
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pled guilty to the seatbelt violation, which carried a fine of twenty-
five and fifty dollars.
45
  
Ms. Atwater later filed a civil rights suit, seeking to challenge her 
arrest for a fine-only offense as a violation of her Fourth Amendment 
rights.
46
 The Court disagreed with Ms. Atwater. Rather than looking 
to the nature of the possible penalty, the Court focused on the 
characterization of the alleged wrongdoing. Under Texas law, failure 
to secure a child with a seatbelt did not carry a jail term, but did 
amount to a misdemeanor.
47
 In other words, the Texas legislature 
somewhat unusually saw fit to include it within crimes covered by its 
state code.
48
 Thus, it made no difference to the Court whether it was 
a violent misdemeanor, or could have been dealt with by way of a 
ticket. The civil-criminal distinction was implicitly at the heart of the 
Court’s analysis.  
Similarly, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court upheld the arrest of 
David Moore, an individual who was driving on a suspended license, 
even though state law indicated such non-violent conduct was to be 
met with a ticket rather than custodial arrest.
49
 Even in the face of 
officers violating the State’s “cite and release” provisions, what 
mattered to the Court for purposes of suppression was that a driving-
without-a-license charge amounted to a misdemeanor crime under 
Virginia’s Code.
50
 It explained that “warrantless arrests for crimes 
committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under 
the Constitution . . . .”
51
 
Interestingly, the vast majority of the Court’s traffic stop cases 
stand in stark contrast to Atwater and Moore. In these matters, the 
Court has spent a great deal of time comparing traffic stops to the 
kind of brief encounter first permitted in Terry v. Ohio.
52
 By and 
large, traffic stops should involve the officer engaging in a brief 
 
 45. Id. at 323. 
 46. Id. at 325. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008). 
 50. Id. at 167.  
 51. Id. at 176.  
 52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (rejecting the notion that “‘stop’and 
‘frisk’ . . .  police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment”). 
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investigation of the situation at hand and then allowing the individual 
to go on their way with a ticket
53
—unless there is some independent 
basis to believe the defendant has committed a crime.
54
 Thus, an 
assumption in most Supreme Court traffic cases is that the underlying 
violations are mere civil infractions, and not crimes in and of 
themselves. Arrest for such conduct would therefore be inappropriate 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
D. Lower Court Rejection of Civil Arrest 
While the United States Supreme Court has not squarely faced the 
question of whether arrest for civil violations violates the Fourth 
Amendment, lower courts have explored the issue. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently decided Santos v. 
Frederick City Board of Commissioners, a case involving a state 
officer who arrested someone for a civil immigration law violation.
55
 
According to the court:  
A law enforcement officer may arrest a suspect only if the 
officer has “‘probable cause’ to believe that the suspect is 
involved in criminal activity.” Because civil immigration 
violations do not constitute crimes, suspicion or knowledge 
that an individual has committed a civil immigration violation, 
by itself, does not give a law enforcement officer probable 
cause to believe that the individual is engaged in criminal 
activity.
56
 
In Edgerly v. San Francisco, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reinstated a false-arrest claim based on a San 
 
 53. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n.29 (1984) (“[M]ost traffic stops 
resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry.”); see 
also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 
(1979). 
 54. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616–17 (2015) (“The question 
whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond 
completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit 
consideration on remand.”); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
 55. Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 56. Id. at 465 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 433 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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Francisco police officer taking an individual into custody for an 
alleged civil violation.
57
 Relying largely on state law interpretation of 
trespass, seen as an infraction for first-time offenders versus a 
misdemeanor, the court overturned a jury verdict against Mr. 
Edgerly.
58
 His matter was remanded for further proceedings, where 
he could prevail on his civil rights violation claim.  
II. CASE STUDY IN UNCONSTITUTIONALITY: ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
& MUNICIPAL POLICING 
In light of this background, physical arrest for anything less than 
clearly criminal conduct should seem patently out of step with 
responsible jurisprudence. Yet the practice of civil arrest is alive, 
well, and the accepted norm. Indeed, recent events in the St. Louis 
area highlight the unabashed use of civil seizures by municipalities in 
Missouri.  
St. Louis County, Missouri is home to eighty-eight distinct 
municipalities;
59
 those St. Louis County areas not governed by a 
municipality are unincorporated, and are thereby governed by St. 
Louis County itself—another municipal organization.
60
 Both St. 
Louis County and its municipalities have their own local 
ordinances.
61
 This Part examines the history of municipal ordinance 
prosecution in Missouri and current widespread practices of civil 
arrest in the region. 
 
 57. Edgerly v. San Francisco, 713 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that arrest for 
California civil infraction could provide grounds for false arrest claim). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Municipalities, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, http://www.stlouisco.com/YourGovernment/ 
Municipalities (last visited Oct. 29, 2016). 
 60. Nancy Curtis, St. Louis Neighborhoods Guide 2015: Unincorporated Living, ST. 
LOUIS MAG. (Mar. 20, 2015, 11:32 AM), https://www.stlmag.com/home/st.-louis-
neighborhoods-guide-2015%3A-unincorporated-living/. 
 61. St. Louis County, Missouri Ordinance Guidebook, ST. LOUIS COUNTY DEP’T OF 
PLANNING (Spring 2011), https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/Document% 20Library/ 
planning/subdivision%20trustee%20resource%20center/county%20resources/Ordinance%20Gu
idebook%204.7.11.pdf; Jeremy Kohler, It’s Not Just Pagedale. Lots of Things Are Against the 
Law in St. Louis County, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.stl 
today.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/it-s-not-just-pagedale-lots-of-things-are-against/article_ 
675579d7-d522-5849-8aff-794cb46abb94.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 52:95 
 
 
A. History of Municipal Matters in Missouri 
1. Local Ordinances as Civil and Not Criminal Provisions 
In Kansas City v. Clark, Kansas City fought for the right to pursue 
the charge of “keeping a gambling table” under its local ordinance 
scheme.
62
 In considering the issues raised by the City, the Missouri 
Supreme Court laid the foundation for what should be the legal 
nature of municipal ordinance violations. It explained:  
Nor do we regard the violation of the ordinance under 
consideration as a crime, since “a crime is an act committed in 
violation of a public law;” a law co-extensive with the 
boundaries of the State which enacts it. Such a definition is 
obviously inapplicable to a mere local law or ordinance, passed 
in pursuance of, and in subordination to, the general or public 
law, for the promotion and preservation of peace and good 
order in a particular locality, and enforced by the collection of 
a pecuniary penalty.
63
 
The Missouri Supreme Court reiterated this holding a few years 
later in Ex parte Hollwedell.
64
 There, the court denied Petitioner’s 
writ of habeas corpus.
65
 In so doing, the court explained in no 
uncertain terms that “[t]he infractions of city ordinances are in no 
sense crimes.”
66
 In Hollwedell, St. Louis City brought a case against 
petitioner for “a breach of the peace . . . by assaulting, striking and 
fighting others, and particularly Louisa Brendley,” which it argued 
constituted a violation of a city ordinance.
67
 Petitioner was convicted 
of the violation after a trial and sentenced to pay a fine. He 
challenged that conviction, arguing that it was unconstitutional 
because St. Louis City did not obtain an indictment nor file a criminal 
information before rendering judgment against him.
68
 Citing Clark, 
 
 62. Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 589 (1878). 
 63. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 64. Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881). 
 65. Id. at 395. 
 66. Id. at 396. 
 67. Id. at 399. 
 68. Id. at 400. 
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the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed.
69
 “If the violation of the 
ordinance for which petitioner was fined is to be regarded as a 
criminal offense in the sense of the constitution, there would be much 
plausibility in the position taken by counsel. Such offenses, however, 
have never in this State been regarded as criminal.”
70
 
Since Clark and Hollwedell, Missouri courts have consistently 
applied the rule that municipal ordinance violations are not crimes.
71
 
In 2015, for instance, the Missouri Supreme Court reiterated the now-
uncontroversial proposition that “[p]rosecutions for municipal 
ordinance violations are civil proceedings . . . .”
72
 
2. Confusion Over the Quasi-Criminal Doctrine 
Yet in Missouri, as in some other places, a tension exists between 
the civil nature of municipal ordinances and the criminal 
consequences they often impose. To reconcile this tension, courts in 
Missouri (and elsewhere) have developed what is known as the 
“quasi-criminal doctrine.” As a general matter, a “quasi-criminal 
proceeding” is “[a] civil proceeding that is conducted in conformity 
with the rules of a criminal proceeding because a penalty analogous 
to a criminal penalty may apply . . . .”
73
 
The Missouri Supreme Court first mentioned the phrase “quasi-
criminal” in 1864.
74
 The phrase was used in passing, without 
explanation, to describe a Missouri statute involving the assignment 
of mortgage interests.
75
 Since that time, Missouri courts have 
 
 69. Id. at 401. 
 70. Id.  
 71. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Meyers, 513 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. 1974); City of St. 
Louis v. St. Louis R. Co., 1 S.W. 305, 307 (Mo. 1886); City of Strafford v. Croxdale, 272 
S.W.3d 401, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting City of Ash Grove v. Christian, 949 S.W.2d 259 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1971)); Kansas City v. Plumb, 419 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); City 
of De Soto v. Brown, 44 Mo. App. 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1891). 
 72. Tupper v. City of St. Louis, 468 S.W.3d 360, 371 (Mo. 2015). 
 73. Quasi-Criminal Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 74. Ewing v. Shelton, 34 Mo. 518, 518 (1864). 
 75. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary traces its definition of “quasi-criminal proceedings” to 
1844. Quasi-Criminal Proceeding, supra note 73. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 52:95 
 
 
repeatedly referenced the phrase “quasi-criminal” without 
meaningfully grappling with the concept.
76
  
Significantly, Missouri courts have largely avoided addressing 
whether municipal ordinances, as civil violations, may impose 
criminal punishments.
77
 Instead, Missouri courts have repeatedly 
glossed over the issue by treating municipal violations as criminal for 
procedural purposes, thereby sidestepping the thorny constitutional 
issues presented by the fact that such violations remain civil in 
nature.
78
 As a result, Missouri municipalities have been free to 
impose criminal sanctions on municipal ordinance violators despite 
their inability to pass and enforce criminal ordinances.
79
 This has 
created an unfair system that is civil for purposes of informality, but 
criminal for allowing arrest and the imposition of punitive sanctions. 
B. Current Problem of Civil Seizures: Policing Post-Ferguson 
The City of Ferguson is a municipality within St. Louis County, 
Missouri. On August 9, 2014, Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson 
shot and killed Michael Brown.
80
 The killing sparked mass protests 
across the St. Louis area, and the police responded viciously. One 
aspect of the police response to the Ferguson uprising was the routine 
arrest of protestors under a number of different Ferguson and St. 
Louis County ordinances.
81
 Both Ferguson and St. Louis County 
 
 76. See, e.g., Blewett v. Smith, 74 Mo. 404, 408 (1881); Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395, 
400 (1881); Missouri City v. Hutchinson, 71 Mo. 46, 49 (1879); City of Lexington v. Curtin, 69 
Mo. 626, 627 (1879); Kansas City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588, 590 (1878); City of Stanberry v. 
Proctor, 48 Mo. App. 56, 56–57 (1892); Piper v. City of Boonville, 32 Mo. App. 138, 139 
(1888). 
 77. See Kansas City v. Bott, 509 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Mo. 1974). 
 78. Id. (discussing whether double jeopardy applies to municipal-ordinance prosecutions); 
Town of Glenwood v. Roberts, 59 Mo. App. 167, 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 1894) (discussing burden 
of proof on municipalities to prove someone violated one of its ordinances). 
 79. St. Louis County Rev. Ord. § 707.020 (making leaving a refrigerator outside in front 
of one’s home punishable by sixty days of imprisonment). 
 80. Ferguson Protests: What We Know of Michael Brown’s Last Minutes, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-28841715. 
 81. See, e.g., Mariah Stewart & Ryan J. Reilly, Dozens of Protesters Were Charged under 
a Bad Law. Now They Could Be Arrested Again, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protesters-st-louis-county-municipal-court_us_ 
574855bfe4b055bb1171e652. 
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have ordinances that prohibit “interfering” with police, for instance.
82
 
Protestors were arrested under such ordinances for “refusing to obey 
a lawful command” or “not complying fast enough,” resulting in 
confinement periods of twelve hours or longer.
83
 It is difficult to 
quantify the number of people who police arrested during the 
uprising—the police have not publicly released such figures, and it is 
questionable whether records of arrests and detentions, as opposed to 
municipal-ordinance prosecutions, are even kept. 
One example of arrest and prosecution in the wake of the 
Ferguson uprising involves the case of Melissa Bennett.
84
 Ms. 
Bennett was arrested on October 22, 2014, outside the Ferguson 
Police Department, for violating St. Louis County Ordinance Section 
701.110, which makes it “unlawful for any person to interfere in any 
manner with a police officer or other employee of the County in the 
performance of his official duties or to obstruct him in any manner 
whatsoever while performing any duty.”
85
 The information St. Louis 
County filed to institute a prosecution against Ms. Bennett described 
her offending conduct as “walking and standing in the roadway after 
being warned not to do so by the police officer.”
86
   
 
 82. ST. LOUIS, MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode.com/ 
library/mo/st._louis_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701DEP
O_701.110INOFUN; City of Ferguson Rev. Ord. § 29-17 (2014). 
 83. See, e.g., Mariah Stewart & Ryan J. Reilly, Dozens of Protesters Were Charged 
Under a Bad Law. Now They Could Be Arrested Again, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2016, 5:00 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protesters-st-louis-county-municipal-court_ 
us_574855bfe4b055bb1171e652; Joel Currier, Federal Judge Bars Police from Forcing 
Ferguson Protesters to ‘Keep Moving,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/federal-judge-bars-police-from-forcing-
ferguson-protesters-to-keep/article_4450191b-2430-5da7-ba40-daa55b735f4d.html. 
 84. Complaint at 1–3, Bennett v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 15SL-CC03628 (filed Oct. 21, 
2015). 
 85. See id.; ST. LOUIS, MO., MO. CODE ORD. § 701.110 (2016), https://www.municode. 
com/library/mo/st._louis_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TITVIIPUSAMO_CH701
DEPO_701.110INOFUN. 
 86. Complaint at 1–3, Bennett v. St. Louis Cnty., No. 15SL-CC03628 (filed Oct. 21, 
2015). It is worth pointing out that St. Louis County did not institute its case against Ms. 
Bennett via petition or complaint, as is the procedure for civil cases in Missouri. Instead, the 
County filed a self-styled “information,” implying that the alleged ordinance violation was a 
criminal violation—as criminal cases are instituted in Missouri when a prosecutor files an 
information against someone, or when a grand jury returns a true bill. 
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We believe that Ms. Bennett’s arrest, as well as other similarly 
situated Ferguson protestors, were extra-legal. Putting other 
constitutional issues aside, municipal police simply lack the authority 
to arrest someone for a mere municipal violation, given its civil 
nature.
87
 Yet they did so on a daily basis during the Ferguson 
uprising, and they continue to do so today.
88
 
Such abuses of power, and the Fourth Amendment, are not limited 
to dramatic events that bring international news crews to the streets 
of St. Louis County. Indeed, they more often occur during mundane 
exchanges between the public and the police in St. Louis County. A 
recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, Copeland v. Locke, provides one such example.
89
  
Police Chief Edward Locke of Bella Villa conducted a traffic stop 
in St. Louis County.
90
 In so doing, Chief Locke parked his police 
cruiser in a way that blocked access to and from a parking lot; this 
prohibited a customer of Norman Steibel’s welding and body shop 
from exiting the lot, and also blocked customers from entering.
91
 Mr. 
Steibel approached Chief Locke and asked him to move his police 
cruiser so the customer could exit.
92
 Chief Locke refused, despite Mr. 
Steibel’s repeated requests.
93
 At this point, Mr. Steibel, standing at 
some distance from Chief Locke, “pointed down the road, said ‘move 
the f* * *ing car,’ and pointed at Chief Locke again.”
94
 Chief Locke 
grabbed his handcuffs and approached Mr. Steibel.
95
 He then  
slammed Steibel against a parked car, threw him to the ground, 
kneed him in the back, yanked and twisted the handcuffs on his 
wrists, and applied continuing pressure to his neck and back. 
As a result of Chief Locke’s force, Mr. Steibel suffered 
 
 87. See supra Part I. 
 88. Dan Keating et al., A Breakdown of the Arrests in Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/ferguson-arrests/. 
 89. Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 90. Id. at 878. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol52/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  Civil Arrest? 113 
 
 
lacerations to both wrists . . . and abrasions across his body 
caused by pieces of gravel and debris.
96
  
Mr. Steibel required emergency room treatment for his injuries.
97
 
Chief Locke later asserted that he arrested Mr. Steibel for 
violating St. Louis County Ordinance Section 701.110. Mr. Steibel 
challenged the arrest in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, asserting that 
Chief Locke lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating Section 
701.110. On summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit agreed.
98
  
We doubt, however, whether merely requesting that an officer 
move his vehicle, which momentarily distracts the officer from 
conducting a routine traffic stop, constitutes interference under 
the ordinance. But, even assuming that a Bella Villa police 
officer is an officer or employee of St. Louis County, which 
we doubt, and that such a distraction does constitute 
interference under the ordinance, such expressive conduct 
cannot constitute an arrestable offense. That is, “[i]t is . . . 
fundamental that a lawful arrest may not ensue where the 
arrestee is merely exercising his First Amendment rights.”
99
 
In other words, if Mr. Steibel violated Section 701.110, the arrest was 
nonetheless unlawful because it violated his First Amendment rights. 
This is clearly the correct result, but it unfortunately overlooks the 
fundamental issue of whether a police officer can arrest someone for 
violating a civil ordinance in the first instance. Thus we believe it is 
time this issue is taken on squarely, in Missouri and beyond. 
III. CONCLUSION: TIME FOR REFORM AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
POLICY 
At this important historic moment, it is time for common sense to 
prevail. In the United States, people are not arrested for breaching 
contracts, committing torts, or engaging in other civil wrongdoings. 
We should not tolerate arrests for traffic violations and other low-
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 881. 
 99. Id. at 880 (quoting Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1387 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
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level conduct that does not rise to the level of actual crime. 
Therefore, states and localities need to reconsider civil arrest 
approaches and replace them with appropriate cite and release 
practices. To be sure, other reforms are necessary to address the 
many injustices that were brought into greater light following events 
in Ferguson, Missouri, including ending jail sentences altogether for 
what amount to minor misdeeds. Some of this work may be 
appropriate for state legislatures.
100
 
However, local municipal bodies can shift their priorities from 
maintaining jails and incarceral structures to the business of building 
communities. The default position for any low-level local offense 
should be presentation of a ticket with notice of a future court date. 
Local police departments can implement these policies, thereby 
allowing resources to be used for truly violent and dangerous 
situations. Immediate action, in collaboration with community actors, 
provides local governments the opportunity to gain the trust of those 
who question the legitimacy of these institutions—which historically 
have disproportionately impacted the poor and persons of color. The 
alternative is for local governments to continue to cling to the past. 
They will find themselves dragged into the twenty-first century and 
met by opposition from activists, advocates, and attorneys calling for 
an end to the uncivil practice of civil arrest. And all the while, police 
will continue to violate the rights of people in America on a daily 
basis. 
 
 100. See also Not Much New in ‘New’ Supreme Court Rules for Muni Courts, ST. LOUIS 
AM. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/political_eye/not-much-new-in-new-
supreme-court-rules-for-muni/article_106f7216-85f3-11e6-b3fb-8389e25f2409.html (calling 
out Missouri Supreme Court’s standards as “insufficient” reforms). 
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